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LABOR LAW
LABOR LAW-Federal Preemption-State Payment
of Unemployment Compensation to Strikers Upheld
New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Labor De-
partment, 440 U.S. 519 (1979). Since the passage of the
National Labor Relations Act on July 5, 1935, the United
States Supreme Court has been faced with the task of de-
lineating the field preempted by federal law from the area re-
maining subject to state regulation. Although the Act leaves
much to the states, "Congress has refrained from telling us
how much,"1 and the Court, "with no less politeness, has
stated that it will follow the 'intent of the Congress.' "2 Most
of the definitive cases have found state regulations to be pre-
empted by the Act, yet the Court has repeatedly indicated
that, not all state laws which touch the bargaining process
should be preempted This "penumbral area ' 4 of permissible
state action must be determined "from conflicting indications
of congressional will . . .-
One such "penumbral area" covers state unemployment
compensation programs. Commentators had hoped that New
York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor7
would conclusively resolve the question of whether laws al-
lowing the payment of unemployment compensation to strik-
ers were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act
1. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
2. Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297, 1348
(1954).
3. Lodge 76, Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 156 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring): "[T]he Court's opin-
ion, does not, however, preclude the States from enforcing, in the context of a labor
dispute, 'neutral' state statutes or rules of decision." Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289 (1970): "We cannot declare pre-empted all
local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships
between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the
States."
4. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 240 (1958) (quoting
Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1955)).
5. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
6. See O'Donnell & Mandel, Benefit Rights During A Strike: A Management
View, 31 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 165, 168 (1978) [hereinafter cited as O'Donnell &
Mandel]; Note, Labor Preemption: Striking Workers' Rights to Collect Unemploy-
ment Benefits-New York Telephone Co. v. New York Department of Labor, 556
F.2d 388 (1977), 4 U. DAYTON L. REv. 239, 240 (1979).
7. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
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(NLRA).5 No conclusive answer was provided. Six Justices'
voted to uphold New York's payment of benefits to strikers
basing their decision primarily on the legislative history of the
NLRA in conjunction with that of the Social Security Act.10
Three Justices concurred, agreeing with the plurality's inter-
pretation of the history of the NLRA and the Social Security
Act, but they questioned the plurality's treatment of earlier
federal labor law preemption cases. The three dissenting Jus-
tices thought that preemption was definitely required. Unfor-
tunately, the Court failed to use the opportunity to establish a
test which could be applied to any state statute which, while
not regulating the private conduct of either party to a labor
dispute, interfered with the "free play of economic forces."1'
This note will first examine prior United States Supreme
Court labor law preemption cases and the effect which New
York Telephone has had on them. Second, it will discuss (ad-
mittedly from a promanagement stance) whether this decision
precludes preemption challenges to other states' unemploy-
ment compensation provisions as these provisions relate to
strikers.
I. PRIOR LAW
Cases holding that state regulation of labor is preempted
by federal labor law can be divided into two categories: those
based on the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board and those based on the NLRA's underlying policy
of maintaiing the free play of economic forces between em-
ployers and employees. San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon12 exemplifies the jurisdictional approach. Whenever
the regulated conduct is subject to the NLRA,'3 or "[w]hen an
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976).
9. Justice Stevens announced the opinion of the Court; he was joined by Justices
White and Rehnquist. Concurring opinions were entered by Justice Brennan and Jus-
tice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Stewart, dissented. (The Stevens opinion will also be referred to
as the plurality opinion).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976).
11. 440 U.S. at 531.
12. 359 U.S. 236 (1958).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) (NLRA § 7) is titled "rights of employees." It provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
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activity is arguably subject to [section] 7 or [section] 8 of the
Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board
if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be
averted. ' 14 The Garmon rule does not apply to general activi-
ties which are "a merely peripheral concern of the Labor
Management Relations Act, ' 15 and the Court has recognized
that "where the regulated conduct touches interests so deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence
of compelling congressional direction, [it] could not infer that
Congress had deprived the States of the power to act. 1 6 Very
few exceptions, however, have been recognized; generally,
these exceptions are malicious libel,1 7 threats of violence 8 and
violence.19
In Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Lester Morton Trucking
Co.,20 the Court extended preemption to an activity which was
not even arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA.21
Preempting the Ohio law against secondary boycotts, the
Court concluded that for a state to proscribe secondary boy-
cotts, which Congress had considered but not proscribed,
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976) (NLRA § 8) is titled "unfair labor practices." Although this
provision is too lengthy to quote verbatim, the areas covered include: (a) Unfair labor
practices by employer; (b) Unfair labor practices by labor organization; (c) Expression
of views without threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit; (d) Obligation to
bargain collectively; (e) Enforceability of contract or agreement to boycott and other
employer; exception; (f) Agreements covering employees in the building and construc-
tion industry; (g) Notification of intention to strike or picket at any health care
institution.
14. 359 U.S. at 245.
15. Id. at 243.
16. Id. at 244 (footnote omitted).
17. Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
18. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
19. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131
(1957).
20. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
21. See also Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. at 500: "For a state to im-
pinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction
of federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or by meth-
ods which the federal Act prohibits."
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would "frustrate the congressional determination to leave this
weapon of self-help available"22 and upset the balance of
power "struck by Congress between the conflicting interests of
the union, the employees, the employer and the commu-
nity. '23 The Court did not look to the jurisdiction of the
NLRB, but rather, it looked to the question of whether the
state statute "would operate to frustrate the purpose of the
federal legislation. '24
In its application of this frustration of purpose approach in
Lodge 76, Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Commission,2 5 the Court not only reaf-
firmed Morton but "adopted a per se rule that Congress must
be deemed to have intended all economic self-help activities
which it chose not to prohibit to be free of regulation by the
states. '26 Machinists made clear the preemption test to be ap-
plied to state control of conduct not arguably protected or
prohibited by the NLRA was "'the exercise of plenary state
authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help [which]
would frustrate effective implementation of the Act's
processes.' ,,27 When state regulation of an economic weapon
interfered with the NLRA's balanced process of collective bar-
gaining "controlled by the free play of economic forces ' 28 pre-
emption would be required. Neither Morton nor Machinists
placed limits on the application of this rule;29 the type and
degree of frustration which would require preemption was not
set out, although Machinists stated that Wisconsin had en-
tered into "'the substantive aspects of the bargaining
process.' o30
22. 377 U.S. at 260.
23. Id. at 259.
24. Id. at 258.
25. 427 U.S. 132 (1976). Justices Stevens and Rehnquist, members of the plurality
in New York Telephone, dissented in Machinists. See note 9 supra.
26. Comment, Federal Preemption of State Welfare and Unemployment Benefits
for Strikers, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 441, 447 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Federal
Preemption]. For a complete discussion of Morton and Machinists, see id. at 444-50.
27. 427 U.S. at 147-48 (quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,
394 U.S. 369, 380 (1969)).
28. 427 U.S. at 144.
29. See Federal Preemption, supra note 26, at 449.
30. 427 U.S. at 149 (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 447, 498 (1960)).
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II. THE New York Telephone DECISION
New York Telephone presented to the United States Su-
preme Court for the first time the question of whether the
payment of unemployment compensation for strikers was pre-
empted by the NLRA. Following a brief nationwide strike by
the Communication Workers of America (CWA) in July, 1971,
against the Bell telephone system, 38,000 CWA members em-
ployed by New York Telephone remained on strike for seven
months. Pursuant to New York's unemployment compensa-
tion law, which requires payment to strikers after a waiting
period of seven weeks, 31 the employer paid a major share of
the $49 million in unemployment benefits claimed by striking
employees.
As a result, the company instituted suit seeking a declara-
tion that the New York statute conflicted with the policies of
the NLRA. The district court 32 agreed wth the company, stat-
ing that "[f]ree collective bargaining, under federal labor pol-
icy, is premised on the concept of government non-interfer-
ence and neutrality."3 3 It also said that cases such as Morton
clearly teach "that any state activity that 'creates a substan-
tial risk of conflict with policies central to federal labor law' is
preempted and barred. 3 4 The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed.35 Although the Second Circuit realized
the general rule of Morton, it concluded that Congress had
"evinced an intention to leave the States free to regulate in
this area."' 6
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second
Circuit. In so doing, Justice Stevens, announcing the judg-
ment of the Court, stated that of the preemption cases, only
Morton and Machinists were relevant here, and that the Gar-
mon line of cases concerned only the question of the NLRB's
31. N.Y. LAB. LAw § 592.1 (McKinney 1977): "The accumulation of benefit rights
by a claimant shall be suspended during a period of seven consecutive weeks, begin-
ning with the day after he lost his employment because of a strike, lockout, or other
industrial controversy in the establishment in which he was employed ... "
32. 434 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
33. Id. at 820.
34. Id. (quoting Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 636
(1975)).
35. 566 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977).
36. Id. at 395.
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primary jurisdiction." The Stevens opinion also accepted the
findings of the district court "that New York's law, like the
state action involved in Morton and Machinists, has altered
the economic balance between labor and management."3 8 At
this point, it would appear that preemption was clearly called
for under the Machinists frustration of purpose approach; 9
however, the Stevens opinion distinguished Morton and Ma-
chinists. Stevens' distinction rested on the basis that those
decisions involved state regulation of private conduct in the
labor-management field, whereas New York Telephone "in-
volve[d] a state program for the distribution of benefits to
certain members of the public . . . the general purport of
[which] is not to regulate the bargaining relationships be-
tween the two classes but instead to provide an efficient
37. 440 U.S. at 530.
38. Id. at 531-32 (footnote omitted). In fact, its impact was twofold. "[T]hey sub-
stantially cushioned the economic impact of the lengthy strike on the striking em-
ployees, and also made the strike more expensive for employers." Id. at 556 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
39. See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra. On initial hearing, Hawaii Tel.
Co. v. Hawaii State Dep't of Labor & Indus. Relations, 405 F. Supp. 275 (D. Hawaii
1976), strictly applied the rule in Morton. The court struck down a work stoppage
statutory scheme for unemployment assistance to strikers because "it irreconcilably
intrudes into the federal process of free collective bargaining." Id. at 290. Since the
work stoppage provision inquired directly into the success or failure of a strike during
an ongoing labor dispute, it impinged into the field preempted by the NLRA. Id. at
284. The Hawaii district court's interpretation of Morton was based on a test pro-
posed by Archibald Cox who extended the Morton approach to create a broader test
of preemption than the arguably protected or prohibited test of Garmon. Recognizing
that Congress created its framework for self-organization and collective bargaining
within the larger context of state laws promoting public health and welfare, Cox be-
lieved that
where the state law is based upon accommodation of the special interests of
employers, unions, employees, or the public in employee self-organization, col-
lective bargaining, or labor disputes . . . the likelihood that its application to
persons under NLRB jurisdiction will upset the balance struck by Congress is
so great as to require exclusion of state law unless Congress had provided
otherwise.
Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1356 (1972), quoted at
405 F. Supp. at 284. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court in
Hawaii Telephone, concluding that based on New York Telephone, Hawaii should
also be allowed to implement its own policy regarding unemployment compensation,
No. 76-1584, 9th Cir., Mar. 10, 1980. For further discussion of the Cox formula see
Comment, Pennsylvania's Lockout Exception to the Labor Dispute Disqualification
from Unemployment Compensation Benefits: Federal Challenges and Issues, 80
DIcK. L. REV. 70, 85 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lockout Exception].
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means of insuring employment security. '4 0 Having categorized
the New York statute as one of broad, general application,
Stevens concluded that it would be more appropriate to treat
this statute with the same deference afforded the state inter-
est exceptions to the Garmon rule,'4 1 a case earlier labelled as
being of "limited relevance. "42
By making this distinction the Stevens opinion avoided
the preemption result which would otherwise have been man-
dated under Morton and Machinists. Those decisions called
for preemption whenever the state had interfered with the
free play of economic forces, unless there was congressional
direction to the contrary. The plurality in New York Tele-
phone, however, stated that state law of general application
which incidentally affected the bargaining process would not
be preempted" 'in the absence of compelling congressional di-
rection.' -3 The Stevens opinion observed that although the
NLRA is silent on the issue, the legislative histories of that
Act and the Social Security Act reveal that payment of unem-
ployment benefits to strikers was omitted from the NLRA.
The opinion concluded that such deliberate silence repre-
sented congressional intent that the states be free to authorize
such payments and therefore, the New York statute would not
be preempted. 4
40. 440 U.S. at 532-33.
41. See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra. This approach also raises a ques-
tion as to the impact this "likening" will have on the current restrictive application of
exceptions to the Garmon rule when the conduct is subject to NLRA §§ 7-8.
42. 440 U.S. at 527.
43. Id. at 540 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
244 (1958)).
44. 440 U.S. at 540. This aparently raises a contradiction. In Morton and Machin-
ists, silence was interpreted as acceptance of all economic weapons not specifically
proscribed. In New York Telephone, silence may be interpreted as acceptance of in-
terference with the free play of economic weapons. Additionally, it was Morton and
Machinists that required evidence of toleration in order to avoid preemption. By
choosing to use the Garmon rule, the plurality was apparently searching the legisla-
tive histories of the NLRA and Social Security Act for "compelling congressional di-
rection," to preempt rather than as evidence of toleration. Id. Consequently, the find-
ing of congressional silence was sufficient to meet the plurality's test. It is ironic,
however, that they went beyond their own requirement of silence and found evidence
of toleration, especially since evidence of toleration would satisfy the rule of Morton
and Machinists.
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III. CONFLICT: THE PREEMPTION TEST
The first question raised by New York Telephone's treat-
ment of conduct not arguably protected or prohibited by the
NLRA, but having an impact on the bargaining process, is its
effect on the rule so recently enunciated in Morton and Ma-
chinists. The concurring opinion of Justices Blackmun and
Marshall best states the major problem raised by the Stevens
opinion:
The difference between Machinists and this case, . . . is
in the initial premise. In the present case, the plurality ap-
pears to be saying that there is no pre-emption unless "com-
pelling congressional direction" indicates otherwise .... In
Machinists, on the other hand, the Court said . .. that
there is pre-emption unless there is evidence of congres-
sional intent to tolerate the state practice. . . . The distinc-
tion is not semantic [and] . . . could prove important in
some other preemption case. Where evidence of congres-
sional intent to tolerate a State's significant alteration of the
balance of economic power is lacking, Machinists might still
require a holding of pre-emption notwithstanding the lack of
compelling congressional direction that the state statute be
pre-empted."'
A. Statutes of Broad, General Application
One conclusion that can be made is that the rule so re-
cently enunciated in Morton, and confirmed in Machinists,
will be applied whenever the state conduct in question at-
tempts to directly regulate the private conduct of the parties
and the economic weapons used by employers and employees.
The Morton-Machinists rule will not be applied, though,
when the state statute is one of broad, general application,
having only an incidental effect on the bargaining process. In
other words, a finding of general applicability would relieve a
court from determining whether the state activity frustrates
"'effective implementation of the Act's processes.' ",46 On the
other hand, earlier decisions finding preemption have held
that it makes no difference "'whether the States have acted
through laws of broad general application rather than laws
45. Id. at 549 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis deleted).
46. Id. (quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
380 (1969)).
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specifically directed towards the governance of industrial
relations.' ,,47
B. An Unemployment Compensation Case
A second conclusion that can be reached is that New York
Telephone will have little impact on the role of Morton and
Machinists in future litigation in the federal labor law pre-
emption area. This conclusion is based on the fact that New
York Telephone is more easily viewed as an unemployment
compensation decision, consistent with the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Social Security Act and the Court's analysis in
prior unemployment compensation cases. Reliance on the his-
tory of the Social Security Act pervades the plurality opin-
ion48 and both concurring opinions agree with the plurality's
interpretation of that Act.49
Although New York Telephone is the first time an unem-
ployment compensation provision paying benefits to strikers
has been challenged in the Supreme Court, it is not the first
time that the Court has ruled on the payment of unemploy-
ment compensation to those involved in labor disputes. In
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory,50 the Court
upheld the denial of unemployment compensation to the
claimant whose disqualification was "due to a labor dispute
other than a lockout at any factory. . . owned or operated by
the employer . ... "I The claimant was laid off by United
47. 440 U.S. at 550 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 244 (1938)). It should also be noted that the broad, general status of strikers in
the New York provision can be challenged. Justice Brennan indicates that he is "not
at all sure the New York statute is a law of general applicability." 440 U.S. at 546 n.*
(Brennan, J., concurring). The dissent also points out that the challenged provision is
not "the entire New York unemployment compensation law but only that portion of
it that provides for benefits for striking employees." Id. at 557 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
48. "The voluminous history of the Social Security Act made it abundantly clear
that Congress intended the several States to have broad freedom in setting up the
types of unemployment compensation they wish." 440 U.S. at 537 (footnote omitted).
"[T]he scheme of the ... Act has always allowed the States great latitude in fashion-
ing their own programs." Id. at 542.
49. See id. at 546-47 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). For a comprehensive view of the conflicting interpretations of the legislative
histories of the Social Security Act and the NLRA see id. at 536-38, 542-43, 560-64
(Powell, J., dissenting).
50. 431 U.S. 471 (1977).
51. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4141.29 (D)(1)(a) (Page 1973).
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States Steel due to a fuel shortage at its Youngstown plant,
caused by a United Mine Workers strike at coal mines owned
by United States Steel. The complainant urged that the state
could not deny benefits to one unemployed under circum-
stances not within his control. Relying on a report by the
Committee on Economic Security,52 the Court upheld the de-
nial of benefits stating that "[t]he fact that Congress has cho-
sen not to legislate on the subject of labor dispute disqualifi-
cations confirms our belief that neither the Social Security
Act nor the Federal Unemployment Tax Act was intended to
restrict the States' freedom to legislate in this area."5
The reliance in the Stevens opinion on the Court's earlier
interpretations of the Social Security Act and cases such as
Hodory is clearly evident:
The analysis in Hodory confirmed this Court's earlier inter-
pretation of Title IX of the Social Security Act in Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, and was itself confirmed
by the Court's subsequent interpretation of Title IV of the
Act in Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416. These cases
demonstrate that Congress has been sensitive to the impor-
tance of the States' interest in fashioning their own unem-
ployment compensation programs and especially their own
eligibility criteria.54
The concurring opinion of Justices Blackmun and Marshall
also relies on Hodory and its indication that "Congress has
been sensitive to the need to allow the States leeway in fash-
ioning unemployment programs. ... 55
C. Hypothesis: A Missed Opportunity
The issue raised in New York Telephone provided an ex-
cellent opportunity for the Court to set down a method for
determining the enforceability of state "laws that are not di-
rected toward altering the bargaining positions of employers
or unions but which may have an incidental affect on relative
52. Report of the Committee on Economic Security, reprinted in Hearings on S.
1130 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1311, 1328 (1955), cited
at 431 U.S. at 482.
53. 431 U.S. at 488-89.
54. 440 U.S. at 538-39 (footnotes omitted).
55. Id. at 548 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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bargaining strength."56 Due to its dependence on the legisla-
tive history of the Social Security Act and its likening of the
New York statute to the Garmon exceptions, however, the
Court failed to take advantage of this opportunity.
A third possible conclusion that can be made as to the ef-
fect of New York Telephone on the Morton-Machinists rule
is at once more heuristic and more tenuous. In Grinnell Corp.
v. Hackett,57 the First Circuit Court of Appeals suggested an
approach which other courts might follow in answering the
preemption question, and which at best, the Supreme Court
impliedly used in New York Telephone."
1. The Balancing Test
In Grinnell the court chose not to rigidly apply the frus-
tration of purpose approach of Morton and Machinists,59 be-
cause "the asserted conflict is not an invasion by the state
into an area of conduct regulated by a national instrumental-
ity but a tangential frustration of the national policy objective
of unfettered collective bargaining . . . -". Since unambigu-
ous congressional intent was lacking,"1 the court called for a
two-pronged balancing test.2
The first question to be answered concerns the payment of
benefits to strikers as palpably infringing upon federal labor
policy. If infringement is found, the second question is if the
state's interest in "cushioning the impact of unemployment is
stronger than the federal interest in untrammelled collective
56. 427 U.S. at 156 (Powell, J., concurring).
57. 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973).
58. The Supreme Court cited Grinnell, although not with reference to the "bal-
ancing test." 440 U.S. at 534 n.24, 540 n.34.
59. See note 39 supra.
60. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989, 992 (1st Cir. 1970).
Although the First Circuit was dealing with a New Jersey statute providing welfare
benefits to strikers, it applied much of the Minter analysis in Grinnell.
61. "The most that can fairly be said, in the face of this legislative record, is that
Congress has been and presently is aware of the problem, has had the opportunity to
resolve it, and has acted in closely analogous circumstances." 475 F.2d at 457.
62. The First Circuit was familiar with the test suggested by Archibald Cox, see
note 39 supra. The court indicated that it was impressed by Cox's suggestions, but
felt it was in no position to adopt or reject such a formula. The court did state, how-
ever, that the Cox formula would require an analysis of impact similar to the one
adopted in Grinnell. 475 F.2d at 461 n.13.
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bargaining." 63 A strong yes to the second question would re-
sult in preemption. Furthermore, if the court finds "that the
state and federal interests are closely balanced it could prop-
erly decline to find preemption because of the historical and
continuing Congressional awareness, opportunity, and demon-
strated willingness [of Congress] to act in this field. '6 4
2. Application of the Balancing Test
The balancing test suggested in Grinnell appears to per-
vade the language of the decision even though the Stevens
opinion did not give voice to it. After carefully distinguishing
the decision from Morton and Machinists,65 the Stevens opin-
ion states that by implementing its broad unemployment
compensation policy New York is not primarily concerned
with the labor dispute. Additionally, "New York has con-
cluded that the community interest in the security of persons
directly affected by a strike outweighs the interest in avoiding
any impact on a particular labor dispute." 66 In New York
Telephone it appears that the answer to the second question
of the Grinnell balancing test is yes: the state's interest is
stronger than the federal, and preemption is not required de-
spite the state's interference with federal labor policy. Argua-
bly, federal and state interests are closely balanced; therefore,
it is proper to decline to find preemption in light of apparent
congressional intent to tolerate the state activity.6 7
Viewing New York Telephone in light of the Grinnell bal-
ancing test would allow the conclusion that the rule to be ap-
plied to conduct which is not arguably protected or prohibited
by the NLRA, but which has an effect on the free play of eco-
nomic forces, remains the frustration of purpose approach
enunciated in Morton and reaffirmed in Machinists. This rule,
however, could not be mechanically applied because the ex-
tent of frustration upon federal labor policy would have to be
determined and then balanced against the state interest being
exerted.
63. Id. at 457.
64. Id.
65. See text accompanying notes 40 & 41 supra.
66. 440 U.S. at 534.
67. See text accompanying note 64 supra. This analysis also prevents the broad
application of this decision to all states' provisions. See text at part IV infra.
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IV. CHALLENGES TO OTHER STATES' PROVISIONS
The second, and most crucial question, raised by New
York Telephone is if the underlying premise-evidence of
congressional toleration of state unemployment compensation
programs-precludes challenges to other states' eligibility pro-
visions which have a greater impact on the bargaining process
than New York's.
The sweeping language of the plurality opinion makes it
virtually impossible to reach any other conclusion but that the
New York Telephone decision does not preclude future chal-
lenges to other states' unemployment compensation provisions
which provide benefits to strikers. In choosing to treat New
York's law with the deference afforded state laws "'rooted in
local feeling and responsibility,' "68 the Stevens opinion de-
clared that "Congress has decided to tolerate a substantial
measure of diversity,"6 9 and, that the "pre-emption doctrine
should not 'hinge on the myriad provisions of state unemploy-
ment compensation laws.' ,to But there are a myriad of state
provisions, and not all are identical to New York's in their
impact on the bargaining process or their statement of inter-
ests; it is possible that the concurring Justices might not join
the plurality in the next analysis of a particular state's provi-
sion providing unemployment compensation benefits to
strikers.
A. Impact
Although Rhode Island and New York are the only two
,states which grant unemployment benefits to strikers after a
prescribed waiting period, sixteen states do not disqualify
claimants if the labor dispute is caused by a lockout; four
states do not disqualify claimants if the dispute is based on
the employer's breach of contract or failure to conform to la-
bor laws. Twenty-nine states disqualify strikers only if a stop-
page of work occurs.7 1 Due to this myriad of state provisions,
68. 440 U.S. at 540 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 244 (1958)).
69. 440 U.S. at 546.
70. Id. at 535 (quoting NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 365 (1951)).
71. For a complete statistical breakdown of state disqualification provisions see
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INS. LAWS § 445 (rev. ed.
1974).
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it is likely that some of these provisions "impermissibly inter-
fere with free collective bargaining"72 to an extent beyond
which Congress might have intended to tolerate, and beyond
the extent of interference created by the New York provision.
Most of these work stoppage provisions are based on the
strikers' disqualification provision proposed in the 1936 Draft
Bills promulgated by the Social Security Board.73 Ironically,
the New York provision may be more effective in attempting
to preserve the "traditional judicial neutrality in labor dis-
putes, '74 than this recommended version. Whereas the Draft
Bill provisions would disqualify an individual for any week
that his unemployment is due "to a stoppage of work which
exists because of a labor dispute at the factory . . .,- the
New York statute suspends the accumulation of benefits
"during a period of seven consecutive weeks beginning with
the day after he lost his employment because of a strike, lock-
out, or other industrial controversy in the establishment in
which he was employed . . .
If a work stoppage does not occur, a striker could begin
collecting benefits after the brief initial waiting period in
states which have adopted the work stoppage provisions;77
furthermore, in other states he could continue to receive bene-
fits if the labor dispute was due to a lockout or employer con-
tract violation.78 Surely these lockout provisions intrude into
collective bargaining to an extent that probably should not be
tolerated; the effect of such provisions is to deprive the em-
ployer from using the lockout as an effective economic
weapon.79
72. O'Donnell & Mandel, supra note 6, at 173.
73. Social Security Board, Draft Bills for State Unemployment Compensation
Plans of the Pooled Income Fund and Employer Reserve Account Type (1936 & rev.
ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as Draft Bills] quoted in Comment, Labor Dispute Dis-
qualification - The Function of "Grade or Class" Provisions in State Unemploy-
ment Compensation Statutes, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 629, 630 n.13 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Labor Dispute Disqualification].
74. Labor Dispute Disqualification, supra note 73, at 631.
75. Draft Bills, supra note 73, at § 5(d).
76. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 592.1 (McKinney 1977). See note 31 supra.
77. See Labor Dispute Disqualification, supra note 73, at 630, for an example of a
work stoppage provision.
78. Id.
79. Lockout Exception, supra note 39, at 86.
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New York, on the other hand, attempts to remain neutral"
for an extended period by failing to base eligibility rules on
whether the unemployment is due to the employees' use of an
economic weapon (strike) or the employer's use of an eco-
nomic weapon (lockout). It is only after this extended period
that New York feels its interest in the welfare of its citizens
outweighs the peripheral infringement on the federal act.
Even advocates of unemployment benefits for strikers recog-
nize that the New York statute is likely to have less impact on
collective bargaining than work stoppage or lockout
provisions:
The impact on collective bargaining of the payment of
unemployment compensation to strikers is difficult to mea-
sure. But whatever it may be when payment is made from
the outset of a strike, the overall impact is not likely to be as
great when payment is begun only after seven or eight
weeks, as it is in Rhode Island and New York .... Since
most strikes do not last as long as seven or eight weeks, em-
ployers and employees ordinarily will not give much weight
in their bargaining to the fact that unemployment compen-
sation benefits will be available if there is a strike and it
does last that long.81
B. State Interest
The balancing test previously discussed not only inquires
into the degree of impact that the state activity has on na-
tional labor policy, but it also inquires into the state's interest
and the degree to which it might outweigh the interest of fed-
eral policy. State provisions also vary in this aspect. Whereas
New York has determined that after seven weeks the
"[e]conomic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious men-
ace to the health, welfare, and morale of the people . . . ,
80. In re Burger, 277 App. Div. 234, 236, 98 N.Y.S.2d 932, 934 (1950): "The main
purpose of section 592 is clear. The State is to stand aside for a time, pending the
settlement of differences between employer and employees, to avoid the imputation
that a strike may be financed through unemployment insurance benefits."
81. Federal Preemption, supra note 26, at 486. "Between 1961 and 1972 the aver-
age annual duration of strikes ranged from 22-27 days." Id. at 486 n.218 (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, MANPOWER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, at table G-4 (1974)). See
Comment, Striker's Eligibility for Public Assistance: The Standard Based on Need,
52 J. URB. L. 115, 131 (1974).
82. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 501 (McKinney 1977).
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other statess" provide a policy which does not preface their
unemployment compensation statutes with any statement of
public policy.84
Lockout provisions and employer contract breach provi-
sions generally reflect an absence of any compelling state in-
terest. "Under those statutes eligibility for benefits depends
upon the labor relations policies of the employer, rather than
on the economic needs, or the unemployed status, of the
employees."' 5
V. LIMITING New York Telephone
Recognition that each state's unemployment compensation
provision, regarding payment of benefits to strikers differs in
its impact on the collective bargaining process, necessitates
(at least from the management attorney's point of view) limit-
ing New York Telephone to New York's extended waiting pe-
riod provision. By basing its decision primarily on congres-
sional intent found in the Social Security Act and failing to
voice the balancing test arguably present, and whose funda-
mental question is "how greatly the plan frustrates national
labor policy,"8 6 "[tihe plurality's sweeping view of the
[NLRA] lays open the way for any State to undermine com-
pletely the collective-bargaining process within its borders. 8 7
Admittedly, limiting this decision is not an easy task. Es-
tablishing the underlying rationale of the Stevens opinion as
the Grinnell balancing test, and finding that this test should
be applied in the analysis of all other unemployment compen-
sation provisions will most likely be unsuccessful, especially
since the Court was aware of this test and explicitly declined
83. ALASKA STAT. § 23.05.010 (1962): "Purpose. The Department of Labor shall
foster and promote the welfare of the wage earners of the state, improve their work-
ing conditions, and advance their opportunities for profitable employment."
84. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 386-1-181 (1975). The Hawaii statute contains
no statement of public policy. Perhaps this explains the district court's decision in
Hawaii Telephone, that its work stoppage provision was preempted by federal law.
See note 39 supra. It is also arguable that the Hawaii law implements any necessary
state purpose. "The striker picketing a closed-down shop is just as in need of benefits
as the striker picketing a shop in full operation. Nevertheless, Hawaii now gives aid to
the latter but none to the former." 405 F. Supp. at 290.
85. O'Donnell & Mandel, supra note 6, at 173.
86. Note, Federal Preemption of State Payments of Unemployment Compensa-
tion to Strikers, 64 GEo. L.J. 1343, 1347 (1976).
87. 440 U.S. at 565-66 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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to use it.ss Pointing out that this clearly was not a majority
opinion will be of little assistance, since the Stevens and con-
curring opinions agreed as to the latitude granted the individ-
ual states by the Social Security Act. 9
In addition, the language of both concurring opinions ap-
pears to specifically limit the evidence of congressional tolera-
tion of the New York statute. Justice Brennan states that
there is "sufficient evidence of congressional intent to decide
this case . . . ."9 Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion
reveals the same limiting aspect, and also indicates an under-
lying balancing test rationale: "[T]he evidence justifies the
conclusion that Congress has decided to permit New York's
unemployment compensation law, notwithstanding its impact
on the balance of bargaining power," 91 to stand.
There is, finally, the dissenters key argument that there is
"[n]othing in the NLRA or its legislative history [which] indi-
cates that Congress intended unemployment compensation for
strikers, let alone employer financing of such compensation, to
be part of the legal structure of collective bargaining. '92 In
fact, the plurality plainly admits that Congress was silent on
the payment of benefits to strikers when it enacted the NLRA
in 1935,' 3 and that their finding of congressional toleration
was not based on any direct evidence but on "inferences
drawn from only the most fragmentary evidence."9' 4
VI. CONCLUSION
It may be that New York Telephone Co. v. New York
State Labor Department has provided support for proponents
of unemployment benefits for strikers. This decision appears
to hold that no state unemployment compensation plan will
be preempted, notwithstanding its impact on the collective
bargaining process. Additionally, this conclusion will be
reached without the necessary and crucial inquiry into the ex-
tent to which the specific state disqualifiction provisions
88. See note 58 supra.
89. See notes 48 & 49 and accompanying text supra.
90. 440 U.S. at 547 (Brennan, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 551 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 556 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
93. Id. at 540.
94. Id. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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"'would frustrate effective implementation of the Act's
processes.' ,,95 Perhaps it is time for Congress, which is argua-
bly aware of the problems' created by payments to strikers,
and their effect on the free play of economic forces, to act, by
either declaring such payments to be a matter of state concern
or by finding that these benefits frustrate federal labor policy.
MARY L. SCHUETTE
95. Id. at 549 (quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S.
369, 380 (1969)).
96. See note 61 supra.
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